Straight to The Point: Operation Able Danger 25 Years Later
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EXCLUSIVE: New Bi-Partisan Push to Declassify FBI Records Mapping 9/11 Hijackers US Support Network and Alleged Saudi Financing “Substantial Highly Relevant Evidence Has Still Not Been Produced In Court And/Or Released Publicly”
The three page letter to the National Archive confirms the FBI records sought through the Public Interest Declassification Board.
With the 25th anniversary of the 9/11 Al Qaeda terrorist attacks that killed nearly three thousand Americans approaching, I sat down with retired Lieutenant Colonel Tony Shaffer who was part of a controversial and classified program called ABLE DANGER. Prior to 9/11, ABLE DANGER datamined phone, travel and financial records to identify al Qaeda members. Shaffer produced new evidence to back up claims that the team identified two of the three 9/11 cells before the attack as well as lead hijacker Mohammed Atta. In 2006, a Senate Report and the DoD internal watchdog (DoD Inspector General) concluded the ABLE DANGER claims were not credible. But in a 2017 sworn affidavit and “Disclosure of Urgent Concern” to the Intelligence Community Internal Watchdog, a DoD IG Senior Executive said the Senate Report was “informed by the flawed and incorrect premises” of the DoD IG report that was part of a “continued pattern of misconduct.”
This wide-ranging interview examines suppressed pre-9/11 intelligence, the present day push for declassification of FBI records on Saudi ties, and accountability 25 years later. We reached out to the Saudi Embassy in Washington DC. A spokesperson confirmed receipt of our questions. We will update if a response becomes available. We reached out to the Intelligence Community Inspector General about the status of the ABLE Danger disclosure. There was no immediate response. The Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission said “The Commission staff did follow up and look into what he (Shaffer) had to say…there was no evidence that Atta had ever been in the USA before June 2000 and the exhaustive investigation of his whereabouts and contacts by both the FBI and German intelligence turned up no evidence that would corroborate the earlier hypothesis of his links to a Brooklyn-based cell. This then turned into the issue of how to explain the confusion.” “I remain attentive to the New York litigation. My longstanding hope was that a criminal trial of the people in our custody would bring out some added details but, again, those would probably affect some particulars rather than overall judgments.”
The three page letter to the National Archive confirms the FBI records sought through the Public Interest Declassification Board.
With the 25th anniversary of the 9/11 Al Qaeda terrorist attacks that killed nearly three thousand Americans approaching, I sat down with retired Lieutenant Colonel Tony Shaffer who was part of a controversial and classified program called ABLE DANGER. Prior to 9/11, ABLE DANGER datamined phone, travel and financial records to identify al Qaeda members. Shaffer produced new evidence to back up claims that the team identified two of the three 9/11 cells before the attack as well as lead hijacker Mohammed Atta. In 2006, a Senate Report and the DoD internal watchdog (DoD Inspector General) concluded the ABLE DANGER claims were not credible. But in a 2017 sworn affidavit and “Disclosure of Urgent Concern” to the Intelligence Community Internal Watchdog, a DoD IG Senior Executive said the Senate Report was “informed by the flawed and incorrect premises” of the DoD IG report that was part of a “continued pattern of misconduct.”
This wide-ranging interview examines suppressed pre-9/11 intelligence, the present day push for declassification of FBI records on Saudi ties, and accountability 25 years later. We reached out to the Saudi Embassy in Washington DC. A spokesperson confirmed receipt of our questions. We will update if a response becomes available. We reached out to the Intelligence Community Inspector General about the status of the ABLE Danger disclosure. There was no immediate response. The Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission said “The Commission staff did follow up and look into what he (Shaffer) had to say…there was no evidence that Atta had ever been in the USA before June 2000 and the exhaustive investigation of his whereabouts and contacts by both the FBI and German intelligence turned up no evidence that would corroborate the earlier hypothesis of his links to a Brooklyn-based cell. This then turned into the issue of how to explain the confusion.” “I remain attentive to the New York litigation. My longstanding hope was that a criminal trial of the people in our custody would bring out some added details but, again, those would probably affect some particulars rather than overall judgments.”
